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Abstract. This paper studies a simple stochastic two-period general equilibrium exchange
model with money, an incomplete market of nominal assets, and a competitive banking sys-
tem, intermediate between consumers and a Central Bank. There is a finite number of agents,
consumers and banks. Default is not permitted. The public policy instruments are, besides real
taxes implicit in the model, public debt and creation of money both implemented at the first
period. The equilibrium existence is established under a “Gains to trade” hypothesis and the
assumption that banks have a non zero endowment of money at each date-event of the model.
JEL classification: C61; C62; D20; D46; D51
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1. Introduction
Various contributions (among others Magill and Quinzii [18], Dre`ze and Polemarchakis [6], and
Dubey and Geanakoplos [8]) have introduced money in a simple two-period stochastic general
equilibrium model with financial markets. In these models, cash-in-advance constraints within
each period (each date-event at the second period) explain the role of money by short term bank
loans which provide within-period liquidity to individual agents, while financial markets implement
for these agents transfers across periods. The money permitting transactions is injected at each
date-event into the economy by a monetary authority. This money supply together with the
corresponding interest rates are, according to the chosen point of view, endogenous or exogenously
specified variables in the definition of monetary equilibrium. Namely, either interest rates form
endogenously in equilibrium to clear the loan markets so far the Central Bank is committed to
specified quantities of money, or the different stocks of money supplied in the loan markets are
endogenous, setting the interest rates as exogenous. A common objective of both frameworks is to
analyze fiscal and monetary policy.
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2In Dre`ze and Polemarchakis [6], financial markets are complete markets of purely financial
assets, more precisely complete markets of elementary securities, each one with payoff of one unit
of revenue at a date-event of the second period. Market completeness allows for the definition of a
consolidated economy in terms of present-value prices and monetary balances which simplifies the
monetary equilibrium existence problem, but the model can be extended in principle to incomplete
asset markets. In Magill and Quinzii [18], financial markets of nominal assets are incomplete. In
their paper, the role of the public authority is not only to inject into the economy the supply of
money permitting transactions but, under the name of Central Exchange, to perform the function
of marketing the agents’ endowments under the simplifying assumption that selling and buying
commodity prices faced by individual agents are proportional. Under this assumption, the existence
of a monetary equilibrium is proved using methods which extend to this framework methods used
in the GEI equilibrium existence problem. Finally in Dubey and Geanakoplos [8], asset markets
are incomplete and the equilibrium existence problem is dealt with, without intervention of Central
Exchange. Besides a greater generality in the definition of assets, which do not need be nominal
assets, and of the bonds sold in counterpart of bank loans, the main difference with the previous
models, where outside money1 was explicitly ruled out, is in the hypothesis that individual agents
have at each date-event private endowments of money. The presence of this outside money plays a
role in the monetary equilibrium existence proof. Equilibrium exists if the total private endowment
of money is strictly positive at the first period and if the government money supply is also strictly
positive on all monetary markets. Without private endowment of money, equilibrium existence
may fail, especially if assets are not nominal.
In the present paper, as Tsomocos [19], we add to the standard general equilibrium exchange
model with incomplete markets and money a competitive banking system intermediate between
agents and the Central Bank. Our modeling choices, which will be made precise in Section 2,
parallel the ones of Tsomocos [19] and Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos [12], with several differ-
ences that the precise description of the model will make clear. Consumers and commercial banks
have at each date-event a contingent endowment of (outside) money that one can interpret, at
least for consumers, as a government transfer or, preferably, as the private inheritance from the
(unmodelled) past. Consumers and banks have access to the financial market. At each date-event,
they are submitted to a cash-in-advance constraint that they satisfy using the different monetary
markets. More precisely, at each date-event, banks extend credit to consumers via the short term
credit market. In counterpart, banks may borrow from consumers in the short term and from the
Central Bank in the long term via the interbank credit market.
As a first approach to the equilibrium existence problem, default is not permitted. When study-
ing the role of the banking system in an economy without production and whose only available
goods are non-durable, absence of default has probably some realism. Also, while Tsomocos con-
siders assets with payoffs denominated in commodity bundles as well as in money, following Magill
and Quinzii [18], Dre`ze and Polemarchakis [6], we restrict ourselves to financial markets of purely
nominal assets. And we model here the public debt as an explicit government intervention (namely
as an initial positive supply of bonds) on the financial market. Together with the amount of created
money and the specification of taxes, implicitly described in our model by the definition of (after
taxes) real endowments of agents, the amount of the public debt is one of the instruments of the
fiscal-financial-monetary policy of government. Besides its budget constraint (and in particular the
1Inside money is money created in the banking activity. Outside money does not bear any other commitment
than the persistence of its existence.
3obligation of paying back the public debt at the second period), the government has no optimizing
behavior, contrary to the consumers who maximize intertemporal utility under budget constraints
and to the commercial banks which maximize each a utility function of their positive balance at
the end of each date-event. As in Tsomocos [19], the assumption that that consumers bid at the
first period for shares of commercial banks which determine the share of the final bank balances
they receive at the different states of the last period closes the model. Equilibrium is defined as a
collection of prices and actions such that consumers and banks optimize their utility under their
budget constraint and all markets clear.
We focus here on the equilibrium existence problem when the level of each public policy instru-
ment is exogenously specified. The equilibrium existence theorem we prove requires, besides usual
assumptions of consumers’survival and continuity, strict monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity of
utility functions, the presence in the model of both inside and outside money and the assumption
that, roughly speaking, autarky is never optimal at any date-event for consumers. Some form of
such an hypothesis, usually known as “gain-to-trade hypothesis”, is used in any monetary general
equilibrium model in order to guarantee that money is effectively used at equilibrium.
Our equilibrium existence proof is classical in its general philosophy but by no means in its
specification. Along with the market clearing relations, monetary regulations of the banking ac-
tivity (in use in every “real” economy) allow for the definition of a compact economy. Equilibrium
in the compact economy arises from a simultaneous optimization process performed by consumers,
banks and two kind of auctioneers. The first one, as the Walrasian auctioneer of the Arrow–Debreu
model [1], sets here not only commodity and asset prices but also the different interest rates in
reaction to the market actions of the different agents. According to an idea of Gourdel–Triki [14],
the second auctioneer sets state prices for money at each date-event so as to allow the supply of
money to meet at equilibrium the cash in advance needs of consumers and banks. Finally, the
equilibrium of the compact economy is proved to be an equilibrium of the original economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the model and its different assump-
tions. Section 3 is devoted to the equilibrium existence proof. We emphasize that the equilibrium
existence could not be deduced from any existing result. Introducing the possibility of default
under different settings as well as studying the relations between existence of equilibrium with and
without default will be the object of future research.
2. The model
We consider a closed competitive model with a finite set I of consumers, a finite set B of
commercial banks and a Central Bank. There are two time periods t ∈ {0, 1} and a finite set S
of states of the world at time t = 1. At time t = 0, the state of the world, denoted s = 0, is
known with certainty and we set S∗ = S ∪ {0}. As in the classical GEI model, there is at each
state s ∈ S∗ a spot market for a finite set L of goods, and, at time 0, a market for a finite set J
of nominal assets whose returns are paid at time 1 contingent on the realized state of the world.
The jth column of a (S × J)-matrix R defines the return of asset j in each state s of the period
t = 1 denominated in money. One of the assets (say the first one) is a public bond whose return
is 1 in every state of nature at time 1. This bond is in positive supply zG1 , an exogenous quantity
which represents the initial public debt fixed by the authority, to be repaid at time t = 1. The
assumption that consumers and banks have no endowment in assets and no short sale constraint
completes the description of the financial structure of the economy. In addition, there is, at time
0, an auction market open to all consumers for the profit shares of the commercial banks.
4Money is the stipulated means of exchange. Every expenditure of consumers or banks is submit-
ted to a cash-in-advance constraint which expresses that it should be paid with the money at hand
at the time of the transaction. On the other hand, transactions are facilitated by the existence
of a system of short term deposits and loans from consumers to banks at each state of the world,
and by a system of long term deposits and loans from banks to the interbank credit market. The
Central Bank conducts its monetary policy through creation of money. A regulation authority
fixes requirements for the commercial banks.
Each consumer i has RL(1+S)+ as consumption set. He is characterized by a contingent endow-
ment of goods ei ∈ RL(1+S)+ , a contingent endowment of money eim ∈ R1+S+ and by a utility function
ui : RL(1+S)+ → R that represents as well his intertemporal preferences on consumption of goods as
his attitude toward uncertainty.
Each commercial bank b is characterized by a contingent initial endowment in money ebm ∈ R1+S+
and by an objective function ub : R1+S → R of the vector (pib(s))
s∈S∗ of its monetary holdings
at the end of the period in each state of the world. The function ub describes as well the in-
tertemporal preferences of b on monetary holdings as its attitude toward uncertainty. For exam-
ple, following the von Neumann–Morgenstern definition, one can assume that ub
((
pib(s)
)
s∈S∗
)
=
pib(0)+λb
∑
s∈S α
b
spi
b(s), where λb is a discount factor and (αbs)s∈S is a probability distribution on
S. Financial requirements are modelled through reserve and capital ratios (k1s)s∈S∗ and (k
2
s)s∈S∗
to be precise later.
As consumers can consume, buy or sell assets, deposit and lend money in the short term credit
market, bid for shares in the ownership of commercial banks, and transfer money from time 0 to
period 1, the choice set of consumer i is Σi = RLS∗+ ×RJ ×RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×RB+ ×R+. As commercial
banks can buy or sell assets, admit short term deposits and extend short term credits to consumers,
deposit and lend money in the interbank credit system, choose to hold money at the end and in each
state of each period, the choice set of each commercial bank is Σb = RJ×RS∗+ ×RS
∗
+ ×R+×R+×RS
∗
+ .
Let us denote by zG = (zG1 , 0, . . . , 0) the public portfolio and by M
CB the money created (or
destroyed) by the Central Bank. The previous data define the economy:
E =
(
(Σi, ui, ei, eim)i∈I , (Σ
b, ub, ebm)b∈B , R, (k
1
s , k
2
s)s∈S∗ , z
G,MCB
)
.
The functioning of E is as follows.
At each state s ∈ S∗, the consumer i consumes xi(s) ∈ RL+, borrows the quantity µi(s) =∑
b∈B µ
i
b(s) ∈ R+ or deposit the quantity δi(s) =
∑
b∈B δ
i
b(s) ∈ R+ in the short term consumer
credit market. In addition, at time 0, i chooses a portfolio zi ∈ RJ and spends the quantities
(υib)b∈B ∈ RB+. These quantities determine its shares
θib =
{
υibP
j∈I υ
j
b
if
∑
j∈I υ
j
b > 0
0 if
∑
j∈I υ
j
b = 0
in the profit of each bank b at period 1.
To summarize, given price systems p ∈ RL(1+S)+ for commodities and q ∈ RJ+ for assets, given
short term interest rates
(
rd(s), r(s)
)
s∈S∗ ∈ R2S
∗
+ for deposits and loans of consumers,
2, given also
2In view of the writing of the equilibrium model and the assumptions which will be done later on the utility
functions and the return matrix, commodity and asset prices and all short term and long term interest rates are
assumed to be non-negative.
5the vectors of distributed profits
(
(pib(s)
)
b∈B of commercial banks at each state s ∈ S and the
quantities bidden by the other consumers in the equity market for commercial banks, the budget
set of consumer i in his choice set Σi
Bi
(
p, q, rd, r,
(
pib(s)s∈S
)
b∈B , (υ
i′b)i′ 6=i, b∈B
)
is determined by the following constraints at period 0 and in each state s of period 1. As all
transactions are made against money, agents cannot use for their purchases the receipts from their
sales. Cash-in-advance constraints (1) and (3) below express this hypothesis. For the sake of
notational ease, the positive part (resp. the negative part) of any vector y is indifferently denoted
y+ or y+ (resp. y− or y−).
At time t = 0,
(1) p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))+ + q · zi+ + δi(0) +∑
b∈B
υib ≤ eim(0) +
µi(0)
1 + r(0)
(2) p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · zi + r(0)
1 + r(0)
µi(0) +
∑
b∈B
υib + pi
i(0) ≤ eim(0) + rd(0)δi(0)
For symmetry with banks, we denote pii(0) the positive amount of money that consumer i chooses
to transfer from period 0 to period 1. The quantity pii(0) is not an argument per se of the utility
function of i, but pii(0) > 0 may facilitate a greater consumption of i in every state of t = 1.
(3) p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))+ +R(s) · zi− + δi(s) ≤ eim(s) + pii(0) + µi(s)1 + r(s)
(4) p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))+ r(s)
1 + r(s)
µi(s) ≤ eim(s) + pii(0) +R(s) · zi + rd(s)δi(s) +
∑
b∈B
θibpi
b(s).
Each consumer chooses σi =
(
xi, zi, δi, µi, (υib)b∈B , pi
i(0)
) ∈ Σi, so as to maximize his utility
function ui(xi) in this budget set.
Symmetrically, at each state s ∈ S∗, the bank b extends a total amount mb(s) of short term
credits to consumers, admits from them a total amount of short term deposits db(s). At time 0, b
chooses a portfolio zb ∈ RJ , borrows the amount of money µb and loans the amount of money δb in
the interbank credit market, issues the equities υb =
∑
i∈I υ
i
b and transfers the positive amount of
money pib(0) from period 0 to the different states of period 1. Notice that in our model, commercial
banks have a passive role in the equity markets which automatically clears.
Given the price system q ∈ RJ+ for assets, given short term interest rates
(
rd(s), r(s)
)
s∈S∗ ∈ R2S
∗
+
set respectively for deposits and loans in the consumer credit market, given the long term interest
rate ρ ∈ R+ in the interbank credit market for deposits and loans, given the quantities υib bidden
by the consumers in the equity market for banks, the budget set of bank b
Bb
(
q, rd, r, ρ, (υib)i∈I
)
is defined in its choice set Σb by the following constraints at time 0 and in each state s of period 1.
6For s = 0,
(5) δb ≤ ebm(0)
(6) q · zb+ + δb +mb(0)+ ≤ ebm(0) +
db(0)
1 + rd(0)
+
µb
1 + ρ
+
∑
i∈I
υib
(7) q · zb + δb + rd(0)
1 + rd(0)
db(0) + pib(0) ≤ ebm(0) + r(0)mb(0) +
µb
1 + ρ
+
∑
i∈I
υib
pib(0) denotes the monetary holding of b at the end of t = 0 that bank b chooses to transfer from
period 0 to the different states of period 1. Recall that this quantity is an argument of the utility
function of the bank b.
For each s of period 1,
(8) R(s) · zb− +mb(s) ≤ ebm(s) + pib(0) +
db(s)
1 + rd(s)
(9)
rd(s)
1 + rd(s)
db(s) + µb + pib(s) ≤ ebm(s) + pib(0) +R(s) · zb + r(s)mb(s) + (1 + ρ)δb
In addition at time t = 0 and at each state s of time t = 1, each commercial bank b has to
satisfy the following capital and reserve requirements , where the strictly positive coefficients k1s
and k2s are fixed by the government (or the Cental Bank)
(10) k1sd
b(s) ≤ δb ∀s ∈ S∗;
(11) k2sm
b(s) ≤ ebm(s) ∀s ∈ S∗.
In view of (5), and depending on the size of k1s (which may be small), the reserve requirements
limit the short term deposits admitted by banks. Depending on the size of k2s (which may be
small), the capital requirements limit the short term credits that banks can extend.
pib(s) denotes the positive monetary holding of b at the end of period t = 1 in each state s ∈ S,
to be distributed among consumers following the profit shares θib.
Each bank chooses σb =
(
zb, db,mb, δb, µb, pib
) ∈ Σb so as to maximize its objective function
ub
(
(pib(s)s∈S∗)
)
in its budget set.
The government has at time t = 0 a revenue equal to q · zG and spends at each state s ∈ S
of period t = 1 the amount R(s) · zG = zG1 . This revenue and this expenditure have to be taken
in account when the addition of the end-of period constraints describes the Walras law for this
economy.3 This writing emphasizes the idea that the reimbursement of the public debt is charged
on the revenue of agents at time t = 1.
Central Bank has to verify his balance sheet according to money supply MCB .
Definition 2.1. A monetary equilibrium of E is a collection ((p, q, rd, r, ρ), (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B) ∈
RLS∗ × RJ × RS∗ × RS∗ × R×∏i∈I Σi ×∏b∈B Σb where
3It should be understood that the project of Government and real taxes on consumers are implicit in the definition
of zG and of (after taxes) contingent endowments of consumers.
7(1) For each i ∈ I, σi ∈ argmax{ui(x˜i) : σ˜i = (x˜i, z˜i, δ˜i, µ˜i, (υ˜ib)b∈B) ∈ Bi(p, q, r, rd, (σb)b∈B)},
(2) For each b ∈ B, σb ∈ argmax{ub(pib(s)s∈S∗) : σ˜b = (z˜b, d˜b, m˜b, δ˜b, µ˜b) ∈ Bb(q, rd, r, ρ, (σi)i∈I)},
(3) All markets clear:
(a)
∑
i∈I(x
i(s)− ei(s)) = 0, ∀s ∈ S∗ i.e. all commodity markets clear,
(b)
∑
i∈I z
i +
∑
b∈B z
b = zG = (zG1 , 0, . . . , 0), i.e. asset market clears,
(c)
(
1 + r(s)
)∑
b∈Bm
b(s) =
∑
i∈I µ
i(s) ∀s ∈ S∗, i.e. credit market clears,
(d)
∑
b∈B d
b(s) =
(
1 + rd(s)
)∑
i∈I δ
i(s) ∀s ∈ S∗, i.e. deposit market clears,
(e)
∑
b∈B µ
b = (1+ρ)(
∑
b∈B δ
b+MCB), i.e. the balance sheet of Central Bank is verified,
(f) For each bank b,
∑
i∈I θ
i
b = 1, i.e. the equity markets for ownership shares of banks
clear.
Definition 2.2. We will call feasible allocation any collection
(
(σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
) ∈ ∏i∈I Σi ×∏
b∈B Σ
b satisfying the market clearing relations (3) of the previous definition.
Let us set e =
∑
i∈I e
i, M(0) =
∑
i∈I e
i
m(0) +
∑
b∈B e
b
m(0), ∀s ∈ S, M(s) =
∑
i∈I e
i
m(s) +∑
b∈B e
b
m(s). We will prove the existence of a monetary equilibrium under the following assump-
tions on E :
A.1: For each i ∈ I,
(1) The consumption set is RL(1+S
∗)
+ , e
i ∈ RL(1+S∗)+ ,
(2) The utility function ui : RL(1+S)+ → R is continuous, strictly monotone and strictly
quasi-concave4,
(3) eim =
(
eim(s)
)
s∈S∗ ≥ 0.
A.2: For each b ∈ B,
(1) ebm =
(
ebm(s)
)
s∈S∗ ≥ 0,
(2) The objective function ub : R1+S → R is continuous, strictly monotone and strictly
quasi-concave.
A.3: On the financial side,
(1) The return matrix R has full rank and we assume R ≥ 0, R1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) (the first
asset has 1 for return in every state s ∈ S),
(2) Each agent (consumer or bank) has RJ as portfolio set,
(3) The total supply of the first asset, equal to zG1 , is positive: z
G
1 > 0; the other assets
are in zero supply.
A.4: Survival and presence of inside and outside money in the economy:
(1)
∑
i∈I e
i(0) 0 and for each i ∈ I, for every s ∈ S, ei(s) 0,
(2) For each b ∈ B, for every s ∈ S∗, ebm(s) > 0,
(3) MCB > 0,
(4) M(s) =M(s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
A.5: Gains to trade:
Every consumption allocation (xi)i∈I ∈ RLS∗I that satisfies, for some s ∈ S∗, xi(s) =
ei(s) ∀i ∈ I permits, in this state, at least δ-gain to trade where
δ =
M(0) +M(s)
MCB
,
4By strict quasi-concavity of a function ui we mean that ui is quasi-concave and that
ui(exi) > ui(xi)=⇒ui`λxi + (1− λ)exi´ > ui(xi) ∀λ : 0 < λ < 1.
8that is, there exist trades
(
τ i(s)
)
i∈I ∈ RL, such that
∑
i∈I τ
i(s) = 0, and for each i ∈ I,
ui(xi−s, e
i(s)+ τ
i
+(s)
1+δ − τ i−(s)) > ui(xi),5 which implies in particular ei(s)+
τ i+(s)
1+δ − τ i−(s) ∈
RL+.
The assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3 (1) and (2) are classical. A.3 (3) and A.4 (3) are constitutive of
the model. Notice that A.3 (1) implies that every asset has a strictly positive return in some state
s ∈ S. Assumption A.5 slightly differs from the usual gain to trade hypothesis. Unlike Tsomocos
[19], it is done also at time t = 0.
We close this section with some properties necessarily verified by a monetary equilibrium under
the assumptions A.1–A.5.
Proposition 2.1. Let
(
p, q,
(
rd(s), (r(s)
)
s∈S∗ , ρ,
(
σi
)
i∈I ,
(
σb
)
b∈B
)
be such that each σi is optimal
in Bi
(
p, q, r, rd, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i
)
and each σb is optimal in Bb(q, rd, r, ρ, (σi)i∈I)}. Then,
(a) p 0, q  0, q1 ≥ 11+ρ and for all s ∈ S∗, 0 ≤ rd(s) ≤ r(s) ≤ ρ;
(b) All end-of-period budget constraints are saturated. Cash-in-advance constraints at state
s ∈ S∗ are saturated provided that rd(s) > 0.
This is true in particular at equilibrium where rd(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S∗.
(c) At equilibrium, for each b ∈ B, pib(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S; consequently, υib > 0 for each i ∈ I and
for every b ∈ B.
Proof. That p 0 follows by classical arguments from the strict monotonicity of utility functions
ui. Likewise, the financial market must not offer arbitrage opportunities. This implies q  0.
If we had q1 < 11+ρ , it would be possible for a bank b to increase simultaneously µ
b of one unit
and zb1 of
1
q1(1+ρ)
, still satisfying its budget constraints at time 0 but realizing at each s ∈ S
a positive profit of 1q1(1+ρ) − 1, in contradiction with the optimality of σb. We next show that
rd(s) ≤ r(s), ∀s ∈ S∗. Assume that r(0) < rd(0). Observe that by increasing µi(0) by one unit and
deposing 11+r(0) extra units, the cash-in advance constraint (1) is satisfied. Since
r(0)
1+r(0) <
rd(0)
1+r(0) ,
the end-of-period constraint (2) holds with strict inequality. It follows that xi(0) can be increased,
improving utility in contradiction to the optimality of σi. An analogous argument can be used to
show that rd(s) ≤ r(s), ∀s ∈ S. Observe that a symmetrical argument (that would conclude that
rd(s) ≥ r(s), ∀s ∈ S∗) cannot be used for banks which are submitted to the reserve requirements
(10).
We subsequently show that r(s) ≤ ρ, ∀s ∈ S∗. Assume that ρ < r(0). Observe that by increasing
µb by one unit and mb(0) by 11+ρ the cash-in-advance constraint (6) is satisfied and profit pi
b(0)
increases by 1+r(0)1+ρ . Since
1+r(0)
1+ρ > 1 the end-of-period constraint (9) at any state s ∈ S holds
with strict inequality, thus pib(s) can be increased in contradiction to the optimality of σb. Finally
assume that ρ < r(s) at some date-event s ∈ S. Increasing µb by one unit the cash-in-advance
constraint at time zero is satisfied and profit pib(0) increases by 11+ρ . This allows to increase m
b(s)
by 11+ρ without violating the cash-in-advance constraint at time 1. Since
1+r(s)
1+ρ > 1, the end-of-
period constraint at any state s ∈ S holds with strict inequality, thus pib(s) can be increased in
contradiction to the optimality of σb. This ends the proof of a.
5As usual, xi−s denotes the vector
`
xi(s)
´
s∈S∗\{s}.
9Saturation of budget constraints is obvious for the end-of-period budget constraints of consumers
and banks. Assume now that for consumer i the constraint (1) is not saturated. If rd(0) > 0, by
increasing δi(0), it would be possible to increase xi(0), still satisfying (2), thus to improve the
utility of consumer i, in contradiction with the optimality of σi. An analogue argument can be
done in each state of nature at time 1.
For banks, if the constraint (6) is not saturated and if r(0) ≥ rd(0) > 0, then increasing mb(0)
increases pib(0), thus the utility of bank b, in contradiction with the optimality of σb. If at state s,
the constraint (8) is not saturated, bank b can increase mb(s)), thus increase pib(s) still satisfying
(9), in contradiction with the optimality of σb.
At equilibrium, the optimality of all equilibrium strategies σi and σb, joint to the market clearing
relations (d) in in Definition 2.1, prevent any rd(s) to be zero.
To prove the last assertion, observe that the no-trade strategy which consists in doing nothing
in the different asset and monetary markets belong to the budget set of each bank b and can afford
to b the vector of profits pib(0) = ebm(0), pi
b(s) = ebm(0) + e
b
m(s) ∀s ∈ S. It follows from the strict
monotonicity of the utility function ub that pib(s) ≥ ebm(0) + ebm(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S. Observe now that
υb =
∑
i∈I υ
i
b can be thought of as the equilibrium price of the profit shares in the ownership of
firm b, an asset whose returns in each state s ∈ S are equal to pib(s). As this market must not
offer arbitrage opportunities to consumers, υib > 0.
Proposition 2.2. Let
(
p, q,
(
rd(s), (r(s)
)
s∈S∗ , ρ,
(
σi
)
i∈I ,
(
σb
)
b∈B
)
be a monetary equilibrium. Then,
(a)
∑
i∈I pi
i(0) +
∑
b∈B pi
b(0) =M(0) +MCB;
(b) If MCB > 0, then for each s ∈ S, 1 + ρ = M(0)+MCB+M(s)
MCB
= 1 + δ.
Proof. a) Summing the end-of-period 0 constraints across consumers and banks, using the equi-
librium market clearing conditions stated in Definition 2.1, and taking in account that the net
revenue of State equals the net expenditure of agents on the asset market, we obtain:∑
i∈I
pii(0) +
∑
b∈B
pib(0) =M(0) +MCB .
b) Summing the end-of-period 1 at state s constraints across consumers and banks, using the
equilibrium market clearing conditions stated in Definition 2.1, and taking in account that the
public debt is reimbursed at time 1, we obtain:
(1 + ρ)MCB =M(s) +
∑
i∈I
pii(0) +
∑
b∈B
pib(0).
It follows from Assumption A.4 (3) and (4) and the definition of δ that
(1 + ρ) =
MCB +M(0) +M(s)
MCB
= 1 + δ
holds for each s ∈ S.
Our assumption on the constancy over s ∈ S of the sum of the private monetary endowments
of the agents is justified by this result. This is compatible with the assumption made in [14] for a
model without intermediate banking system that consumers have no monetary endowment at time
t = 1.
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Observe that at equilibrium, each xi(s) satisfies 0 ≤ xi(s) ≤ ∑i′∈I xi′(s) = e(s). Notice also
that for each i ∈ I and for each b ∈ B, pii(0) ≤M(0) +MCB and pib(0) ≤M(0) +MCB . We have
in addition:
Proposition 2.3. The different monetary and portfolio quantities of a monetary equilibrium(
p, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
are bounded. More precisely,
(a) Without lost of generality, δb = ebm(0) ∀b ∈ B, so that
∑
µb = (1 + δ)(
∑
b e
b
m(0) +M
CB);
(b) For each b and for each s ∈ S∗, db(s) ≤ 1k1s e
b
m(0) and m
b(s) ≤ 1k2s e
b
m(s), one of both
constraints being binded at equilibrium. So that for each s ∈ S∗,
0 ≤
∑
i
δi(s) ≤ 1
k1s
∑
b
ebm(0) and 0 ≤
∑
i
µi(s) ≤ (1 + δ) 1
k2s
∑
b
ebm(s);
(c) There exists A ∈ RJ++ such that
∑
i z
i
− +
∑
b z
b
− ≤ A;
(d) Consequently,
∑
i z
i
+ +
∑
b z
b
+ ≤ A+ zG;
(e) Each υib is bounded;
(f) Finally, for each s ∈ S, each pib(s) is bounded.
Proof. Assertion a. follows from market clearing.
It follows from the constraints (5) and the reserve and capital requirements (10) and (11) that
for each b ∈ B, 0 ≤ db(s) ≤ 1ks ebm(0) and 0 ≤ mb(s) ≤ 1k2s e
b
m(s). It is easily seen that one of both
constraints is binded at equilibrium. The remainder of Assertion b. follows from market clearing
relations and the definition of Π.
Using for each i and for each b relations (3), (8), Assertion a. of the previous proposition and
the short term credit and deposit market clearing, one sees that for every s ∈ S,
0 ≤ R(s) · (∑
i∈
zi− +
∑
b∈B
zb−
) ≤M(0) +MCB +M(s).
Then, Assertion d. follows by classical arguments from Assumption A.3 (1).
Assertion e. follows from the previous assertion and the feasibility condition
∑
i∈I z
i
++
∑
b∈B z
b
+ =
zG +
∑
i∈I z
i
− +
∑
b∈B z
b
−. More precisely, let A ∈ RJ++ be such that for all i ∈ I, 0 ≤ zi− ≤∑
i z
i
− +
∑
b z
b
− ≤ A, and for all b ∈ B, 0 ≤ zb− ≤
∑
i z
i
− +
∑
b z
b
− ≤ A. Then, for all i ∈ I,
0 ≤ zi+ ≤
∑
i z
i
+ +
∑
b z
b
+ ≤ A+ zG, and for all b ∈ B, 0 ≤ zb+ ≤
∑
i z
i
+ +
∑
b z
b
+ ≤ A+ zG.
It then follows from the previous results and relations (1) that for each i ∈ I,∑b υib is bounded
and from relations (9) that for each b ∈ B and every s ∈ S, pib(s) is bounded.
Finally, the next proposition enlightens the role of Assumption A.5.
Proposition 2.4. Let
(
p, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
be a monetary equilibrium. At each state s ∈ S∗ there
is some short term monetary activity.
Proof. Let us first assume that for some s ∈ S, ∑i µi(s) = ∑i δi(s) = 0. A glimpse at (binded)
constraints (3) and (4) shows that for each i, p(s) · (xi(s) − ei(s))− = 0, which, in view of the
strict positivity of p(s) and the market clearing equation, implies xi = ei. It now follows from the
optimality of banks that rd(s) = r(s). Indeed, if we had rd(s) < r(s), some bank b, with some
d′b(s) > 0 and m′b = 11+rd(s))d
′b, could satisfy constraints (8), (9), (10), (11) and increase its profit
pib(s), in contradiction with the optimality of b.
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Then, let
(
τ i(s), i ∈ I) be the transfers referred to in Assumption A.5. For each i, there exist
some δ′i(s), µ′i(s) such that p(s) · τ
i
+(s)
1+δ +δ
′i(s)− µ′i(s)1+r(s) = 0 and p(s) ·
( τ i+(s)
1+δ −τ i(s)
)−rd(s)δ′i(s)+
r(s)
1+r(s)µ
′i(s) > 0. Combining the two previous relations, using rd(s) = r(s), recalling that, in view
of propositions 2.1 and 2.2, 1+r(s)1+δ ≤ 1, we get p(s) · τ i(s) > 0 for all i ∈ I and, summing on i ∈ I,
0 = p(s) ·∑i∈I τ i(s) > 0, a contradiction.
Let us now assume that
∑
i µ
i(0) =
∑
i δ
i(0) = 0. Using the (binded) constraints (1) and (2), we
first get for each i ∈ I, pii(0) = p(0)·(xi(0)−ei(0))−+q·zi−. We first claim that (xi(0)−ei(0))− = 0.
Indeed, if not, by increasing q ·zi−, one can decrease p(0)·
(
xi(0)−ei(0))−, thus increase the utility of
consumer i, without changing pii(0). Since, by Proposition 2.1,
∑
b θ
i
bpi
b(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S, Consumer i
can still verify his budget constraints (3) and (4) via an appropriate choice in each s ∈ S of µi(s) and
δi(s). From
(
xi(0)−ei(0))− = 0 and market clearing at time t = 0, we deduce xi(0) = ei(0) ∀i ∈ I.
Then, using the Gain to trade hypothesis A.5 for time t = 0, the rest of the proof goes as
previously for s ∈ S.
3. Existence of monetary equilibrium
The equilibrium existence will be proved first for a compact economy Ec, defined using the
previous results. It will be the consequence of a fixed point argument in this economy with
modified budget sets for banks and consumers. The definition of modified budget sets using state
prices of money at time 0 and in the different states of the world is inspired by Gourdel–Triki [14],
the fixed point argument follows Florenzano [9]. We will use the following fixed point result which
extends Kakutani [16] and Gale and Mas-Colell [10, 11]:
Lemma 3.1 (Gourdel [13]). Let for each i = 1, · · · ,m, Xi be a convex and compact subset of
some Euclidean vector space, X =
∏m
i=1X
i and ϕi : X → Xi be a convex valued correspondence
which is either lower semicontinuous or upper semicontinuous with closed values. Then, there
exists x = (xi)mi=1 ∈ X such that for each i, either xi ∈ ϕi(x) or ϕi(x) = 6©.
3.1. Truncating the economy and modifying budget sets. If we set pi = (p, q, 11+rd ,
1
1+r ,
1
1+ρ ),
in view of the previous results, we will restrict the prices to belong to the convex and compact set:
Π =
pi ∈ R
LS∗
+ × RJ+ × RS
∗
+ × RS
∗
+ × R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
‖p(0)‖1 + ‖q‖1 = 1
‖p(s)‖1 = 1, ∀s ∈ S
1
1+δ ≤ 11+rd(s) ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S∗
1
1+δ ≤ 11+r(s) ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S∗
1
1+δ ≤ 11+ρ ≤ 1
 .
We next define the strategy sets Σic and Σ
i
c of Ec by the following inequalities on real and
monetary variables:
• ∑b δb =∑b ebm(0);
• ∑b ebm(0) +MCB ≤∑b µb ≤ (1 + δ)(∑b ebm(0) +MCB);
and for all s ∈ S∗,
• 11+δ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0) ≤
∑
b d
b(s) ≤ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0);
• 11+δ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0) ≤
∑
i δ
i(s) ≤ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0);
• 11+δ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s) ≤
∑
bm
b(s) ≤ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s);
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• 11+δ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s) ≤
∑
i µ
i(s) ≤ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s).
For consumption vectors, we assume that
∑
i x
i ≤ 2e.
For portfolios, we assume that
∑
i z
i
− +
∑
b z
b
− ≤ 2A and
∑
i z
i
+ +
∑
b z
b
+ ≤ 3A+ 2zG.
On the other hand, let a = sup{p(0) · e(0) + q ·A : ‖p‖1 + ‖q‖1 = 1}. We set∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0) ≤ 2 (1 + δ)a+ 2 (M(0) +MCB)
and assume that for each i,∑
b
υib ≤ 2
[∑
i
eim(0) + (1 + δ)
1
k20
∑
b
ebm(0)
]
.
For profits at each s ∈ S, we assume∑
b
pib(s) ≤M(0) +M(s) +MCB +R(s) · (A+ zG) + δ(1 + δ) 1
k2s
∑
b
ebm(s).
The truncated economy is
Ec =
(
(Σic, u
i, ei, eim)i∈I , (Σ
b
c, u
b, ebm)b∈B , R, (k
1
s , k
2
s)s∈S∗ , z
G
1 ,M
CB
)
.
Let us now set
M = co
µ ∈ RS
∗
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃((σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B) ∈∏i∈I Σic ×∏b∈B Σbc, ∃pi ∈ Π such that
µ0[M(0) +MCB ] =
∑
i p(0) ·
(
xi(0)− ei(0))−+
q · (∑i zi− +∑b zb− + zG)
µs[M(s) +
∑
i pi
i(0) +
∑
b pi
b(0)] =
∑
i p(s) ·
(
xi(s)− ei(s))−
 .
By definition, M is a convex subset of RS∗+ . As easily verified using the assumptions A.3(1) and
A.4(3), M is also compact. The economic interpretation of the equalities defining M is that, at
each state s ∈ S∗, the actualized value of the total money in the hands of agents should equilibrate
the anticipation of their revenues at the end of the period.
We define in Ec the budget sets of consumers Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi′)i′ 6=i , µ), replacing the con-
straints (1), (2) at time 0 by
(12) p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))+ + q · zi+ + δi(0)− µi(0)1 + r(0) ≤ µ0[eim(0)−∑
b∈B
υib]
(13) p(0) · (xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · zi − rd(0)δi(0) + r(0)1 + r(0)µi(0) ≤ µ0[eim(0)−∑
b∈B
υib − pii(0)]
and replacing the constraints (3) and (4) at each state s of time t = 1 by
(14) p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))+ + δi(s)− µi(s)
1 + r(s)
≤ µs
[
eim(s) + pi
i(0)−R(s) · zi−
]
(15) p(s) ·(xi(s)− ei(s))−rd(s)δi(s)+ r(s)1 + r(s)µi(s) ≤ µs[eim(s)+pii(0)+R(s) ·zi+∑
b∈B
θibpi
b(s)
]
.
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For banks, we define in Ec the budget sets of banks Bb
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
, replacing at time 0 the
constraints (6), (7) by
(16) q · zb+ +mb(0)−
db(0)
1 + rd(0)
≤ µ0
[
ebm(0) +
µb
1 + ρ
− δb +
∑
i∈I
υib
]
(17) q · zb + rd(0)
1 + rd(0)
db(0)− r(0)mb(0) ≤ µ0
[
ebm(0)− pib(0) +
µb
1 + ρ
− δb +
∑
i∈I
υib
]
and replacing at each state s of period 1 the constraints (8) and (9) by
(18) mb(s)− d
b(s)
1 + rd(s)
≤ µs
[
ebm(s) + pi
b(0)−R(s) · zb−
]
(19)
rd(s)
1 + rd(s)
db(s)− r(s)mb(s) ≤ µs
[
ebm(s) + pi
b(0)− pib(s) + (1 + ρ)δb − µb +R(s) · zb].
The reserve and capital requirements (10) and (11) are replaced by
(20) k1sd
b(s) ≤ µsδb ∀s ∈ S∗;
(21) k2sm
b(s) ≤ µsebm(s) ∀s ∈ S∗.
For each i ∈ I (resp. b ∈ B), for each (pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B , µ) ∈ Π ×
∏
i∈I Σ
i
c ×
∏
b∈B Σ
b
c ×M
let us denote by B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i , µ
)
(resp. B′b
(
pi, (σb)i∈I , µ
)
) the sets deduced from
Bi
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i , µ
)
(resp. Bb
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
) replacing all budget inequalities by strict in-
equalities. Let us also denote σi = (ei, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and σb = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) the no-trade strategies
for consumers and banks and define the correspondences:
B′′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i , µ
)
=
{ {σi} if B′i(pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi′)i′ 6=i , µ) = 6©
B′i
(
pi,
(
pib(s)s∈S
)
b∈B , µ
)
if B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i , µ
) 6= 6©
B′′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
=
 {σ
b} if B′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
= 6©
B′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
if B′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
6= 6©
.
Proposition 3.1. In Ec, for each i ∈ I and for all (pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi′)i′ 6=i , µ) ∈ Π ×
∏
b∈B Σ
b
c ×∏
i′ 6=i Σ
i′
c ×M , σi ∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , (σi
′
)i′ 6=i , µ); for each b ∈ B and for all (pi, (σi)i∈I , µ) ∈ Π ×
Σic ×M , σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ). Moreover,
(a) For each i ∈ I, Bi is upper semicontinuous on Π×∏b∈B Σbc ×∏i′ 6=i Σi′c ×M with closed
convex values; B′i has an open graph in Π ×∏b∈B Σbc ×∏i′ 6=i Σi′c ×M × Σic and B′′i is
lower semicontinuous.
(b) For each b ∈ B, Bb is upper semicontinuous on Π×∏i∈I Σic×M with closed convex values;
B′b has an open graph in Π×∏i∈I Σic ×M × Σbc and B′′b is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. For a proof of the lower semicontinuity of B′′i or of B′′b, use a similar argument to the one
used in Florenzano[9], claim 7.2 p.23. The proofs of the other continuity properties are standard.
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3.2. The fixed point argument. The equilibrium existence problem in Ec with the modified
budget sets is clearly a problem of simultaneous optimization that we will solve by finding a fixed
point for the product of the correspondences that we now define:
ϕM
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
=µ ∈M
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ0[M(0) +MCB ] =
∑
i p(0) ·
(
xi(0)− ei(0))−
+q · (∑i zi− +∑b zb− + zG)
µs[M(s) +
∑
i pi
i(0) +
∑
b pi
b(0)] =
∑
i p(s) ·
(
xi(s)− ei(s))−

ϕ0
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
=pi ∈ Π
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p˜ ·∑i(xi − ei) + q˜ · (∑i zi +∑b zb − zG1 ) > p ·∑i(xi − ei) + q · (∑i zi +∑b zb − zG)
1
1+erd(s) = max{ 11+δ ,min{1, Pi δi(s)Pb db(s)}} ∀s ∈ S∗
1
1+er(s) = max{ 11+δ ,min{1, Pbmb(s)Pi µi(s) }} ∀s ∈ S∗
1
1+eρ = max{ 11+δ ,min{1, {Pb δb+MCBPb µb }}

and for each i ∈ I and for each b ∈ B, the following reaction correspondences:
ϕi
(
σi, pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
)
=
{
B′′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
)
if σi /∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ)
B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
) ∩ P i(σi) if σi ∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ)
ϕb
(
σb, pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
=
{
B′′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
if σb /∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ)
B′b
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
) ∩ P b(σb) if σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ)
where P i(σi) = {σ˜i | ui(x˜i) > ui(xi)}, P b(σb) = {σ˜b | ub(pib) > ub(pib)}, and σ−i =
∏
i′ 6=i σ
i′.
Finally,
Φ: M ×Π×
∏
i∈I
Σic ×
∏
b∈B
Σbc →M ×Π×
∏
i∈I
Σic ×
∏
b∈B
Σbc
is defined by:
Φ
(
µ, pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
= ϕM
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)× ϕ0((σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B)
×
∏
i∈I
ϕi
(
σi, pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
)×∏
b∈B
ϕb
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
.
Notice that ϕ0 (actually defined by a product of correspondences) describes the behavior of
an hypothetic auctioneer who sets not only the commodity and asset prices but also the different
interest rates in reaction to the market actions of the agents. The definition of ϕM is specific of
our fixed point argument.
Under the assumptions A.3 and A.4, ϕM is an upper semicontinuous correspondence. The
first correspondence defining ϕ0 has an open graph. The following ones are, by construction,
continuous functions. Coming now to the definition of ϕi and ϕb, we remark that for each i,(
B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
)∩P i(σi)) ⊂ B′′i(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ), and for each b, (B′b(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ)∩
P b(σb)
)
⊂ B′′b(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ). It then follows from Proposition 3.1, the continuity of utility func-
tions and their definition that each ϕi (resp. each ϕb) is a lower semicontinuous correspondence
with convex values.
Applying Lemma 3.1, one gets immediately the following “fixed point” result:
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Proposition 3.2. There exists
(
µ, pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
) ∈M ×Π× Σic × Σbc such that:
(a) µ0[M(0) +MCB ] =
∑
i p(0) ·
(
xi(0)− ei(0))− + q · (∑i zi− +∑b zb− + zG),
∀s ∈ S, µs[M(s) +
∑
i pi
i(0) +
∑
b pi
b(0)] =
∑
i p(s) ·
(
xi(s)− ei(s))−,
(b) (p− p) ·∑i(xi − ei) + (q − q) · (∑i zi +∑b zb − zG) ≤ 0
for all (p, q) ≥ 0 such that ‖p(0)‖1 + ‖q‖1 = 1, ‖p(s)‖1 = 1, ∀s ∈ S,
(c) ∀s ∈ S∗, 11+rd(s) = max
{
1
1+δ ,min{1,
P
i δ
i
(s)P
b d
b
(s)
}}
(d) ∀s ∈ S∗, 11+r(s) = max
{
1
1+δ ,min{1,
P
bm
b(s)P
i µ
i(s)
}
(e) 11+ρ = max
{
1
1+δ ,min{1,
P
b δ
b
+MCBP
b µ
b }
}
(f) for each i ∈ I, σi ∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ) and B′i(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ) ∩ P i(σi) = 6©,
(g) for each b ∈ B, σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ) and B′b(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ) ∩ P b(σb) = 6©.
Remark 3.2. Since each σb is in Bb
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
, it follows from the truncation and from the
capital and reserve requirements in the modified budget sets that µs ≥ 11+δ ∀s ∈ S∗.
We are now in conditions of proving the main result of this section.
Proposition 3.3. Under the assumptions A.1 – A.5, the economy Ec has a monetary equilibrium.
Consequently, under the same conditions, E has a monetary equilibrium.
Proof. Let
(
µ, pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
satisfy the assertions of the previous proposition. The proof of
the first assertion of Proposition 3.3 will be done in a series of claims establishing properties of the
“equilibrium point”
(
µ, pi, (σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B
)
.
Claim 3.3. (a) One has
(22)
∑
b δ
b
+MCB∑
b µ
b
≥ 1
1 + δ
and for every s ∈ S∗,
(23)
∑
i δ
i
(s)∑
b d
b
(s)
≥ 1
1 + δ
;
∑
bm
b(s)∑
i µ
i(s)
≥ 1
1 + δ
.
(b) Consequently,
(24)
1
1 + ρ
∑
b
µb ≤
∑
b
δ
b
+MCB
and for every s ∈ S∗,
(25)
1
1 + rd(s)
∑
b
d
b
(s) ≤
∑
i
δ
i
(s) ;
1
1 + r(s)
∑
i
µi(s) ≤
∑
b
mb(s).
a. is proved using the bounds which define Σic and Σ
b
c. b. follows from a. and the relations
giving the short term and long term interest rates in Proposition 3.2.
Claim 3.4. a. At time 0,
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) ≤ 0 and ∑i∈I zi +∑b∈B zb ≤ zG.
b. At each state s of time 1,
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) ≤ 0.
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To prove a., let us remark that it follows easily from pi ∈ ϕ0((σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B) that for each(
p(0), q
) ≥ 0 such that ‖p(0)‖1 + ‖q‖1 = 1,
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)−ei(0))+q ·(∑
i
zi+
∑
b
zb−zG) ≤ p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)−ei(0))+q ·(∑
i
zi+
∑
b
zb−zG).
On the other hand, each σi ∈ Bi(pi, ((σb)b∈B , σ−i, µ) and σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ). Adding the cash
in advance constraints (12) and (16) at time 0 of consumers and banks, we get:
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ + q · (∑
i
zi+ +
∑
b
zb+
)
+
(∑
i
δ
i
(0)− 1
1 + rd(0)
∑
b
d
b
(0)
)
+
(∑
mb(0)− 1
1 + r(0)
∑
i
µi(0)
) ≤ µ0[M(0) + ( 11 + ρ∑
b
µb −
∑
b
δ
b
)
]
.
Taking in account the relations proved in b. of the previous claim, we deduce:
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ + q · (∑
i
zi+ +
∑
b
zb+
) ≤ µ0[M(0) +MCB ]
From Proposition 3.2, we have also:
µ0[M(0) +M
CB ] = p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))− + q · (∑
i
zi− +
∑
b
zb− + z
G
)
.
Combining the previous relations, we get:
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · (∑
i
zi +
∑
b
zb − zG) ≤ 0.
Since for each
(
p(0), q
) ∈ RL+ × RJ+ such that ‖p(0)‖1 + ‖q‖1 = 1,
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · (∑
i
zi +
∑
b
zb − zG) ≤ 0,
the part a. of our claim is proved.
For each s ∈ S, it follows from pi ∈ ϕ0((σi)i∈I , (σb)b∈B) that for each p(s) ≥ 0 such that
‖p(s)‖1 = 1,
p(s) ·
∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) ≤ p(s) ·∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s)).
Since each σi ∈ Bi(pi, ((σb)b∈B , σ−i, µ) and σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ), adding the cash in advance
constraints (14) and (18) at state s of consumers and banks, we get for the “fixed point” of Φ:
p(s) ·
∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s))+ + (∑
i
δ
i
(s)− 1
1 + rd(s)
∑
b
d
b
(s)
)
+
(∑
mb(s)− 1
1 + r(s)
∑
i
µi(s)
)
≤ µs
[
M(s) +
∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0)−R(s) · (∑
i
zi− +
∑
b
zb−
)] ≤ µs[M(s) +∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0)
]
.
From this and relations proved in b. of the previous claim, we get:
p(s) ·
∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s))+ ≤ µs[M(s) +∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0)].
From Proposition 3.2, we have also:
(26) µs[M(s) +
∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0)] =
∑
i
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−
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We thus deduce:
p(s) ·
∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s))+ ≤∑
i
p(s) · (xi(s)− ei(s))−,
that is, p(s) ·∑i(xi(s)− ei(s)) ≤ 0). Since for each p(s) ∈ RL+ such that ‖p(s)‖1 = 1,
p(s) ·
∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) ≤ p(s) ·∑
i
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) ≤ 0,
the part b. of our claim is proved.
Remark 3.5. One will keep in mind that it follows from the previous claim that
∑
i x
i  2e and
that
∑
i z
i
+ +
∑
b z
b
+  3A+ 2zG.
Claim 3.6. For some i ∈ I, σi ∈ argmax{ui(xi) : σi ∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ)}.
As it follows from a classical argument, to prove the claim, it suffices to verify that for some i ∈ I,
B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
) 6= 6©. To see that, for each i ∈ I and in each s ∈ S, one can first choose
µi(s) such than 0 < µi(s) < p(s) · ei(s) and zi such that µsR(s) · zi− < µ
i(s)
1+r(s) ∀s ∈ S and q · zi− > 0
if q 6= 0. At state 0, µi(0) must be chosen such that µi(0) > 0 and r(0)1+r(0)µi(0) < p(0) ·ei(0)+q ·zi−.
This is possible for every i ∈ I if q 6= 0. and at least for one i ∈ I if q = 0, according to the
normalization of prices at period 0 and the survival assumption in A.4.
Claim 3.7. Consequently, p 0, q  0, and, for each i ∈ I,
σi ∈ argmax{ui(xi) : σi ∈ Bi(pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ)} .
In view of Assumption A.3 (1), each asset has a nonzero return in some state s ∈ S. In view of
Remark 3.5, that p 0 and q  0 follow from the previous claim.
The proof that B′i
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
) 6= 6© is as in Claim 3.6, even simpler.
Claim 3.8. For each b ∈ B, σb ∈ argmax{ub(pib) : σb ∈ Bb(pi, (σi)i∈I , µ)}.
For each b ∈ B, the optimality of σb implies that pib(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S and thus that∑
i∈I θ
i
b = 1.
Since q1 > 0, using the assumption A.4 (2), for each b ∈ B, one can choose zb+ such that
q · zb+ < µ0ebm(0) and for each s ∈ S, db(s) > 0 such that rd(s)1+rd(s)db(s) < µsR(s) · zb+. This shows
that B′b
(
pi, (υib)i∈I , µ
)
6= 6©, thus that σb is optimal in Bb
(
pi, (υib)i∈I , µ
)
.
To prove the last assertion, observe that the no-trade strategy which consists in doing nothing
in the different asset and monetary markets can afford to the bank b the vector of profits pib(0) =
ebm(0), pi
b(s) = ebm(0)+e
b
m(s) ∀s ∈ S. It follows from the strict monotonicity of the utility function
ub that pib(s) ≥ ebm(0) + ebm(s) > 0 ∀s ∈ S. Observe now that υb =
∑
i∈I υ
i
b can be thought of as
the equilibrium price of the profit shares in the ownership of firm b, an asset whose returns in each
state s ∈ S are equal to pib(s). As this market must not offer arbitrage opportunities to consumers,
υb =
∑
i∈I υ
i
b > 0. It thus follows that
∑
i∈I θ
i
b = 1.
Claim 3.9. The long term monetary market and all short term monetary markets clear.
For the long term monetary market, market clearing simply follows from the bounds on
∑
b µ
b.
Now, by definition, if rd(s) > 0, market clearing follows. Recalling that, in view of Remark
3.5,
∑
i x
i(s)  2e, if rd(s) = 0, it follows from the optimality of each σi that
∑
i δ
i
(s) =
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1
1+δ
1
k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0). We then have
P
i δ
i
(s)P
b d
b
(s)
≤ 1, which shows market clearing for the short term
market of deposit.
The proof of market clearing for the short term market for borrowing and lending is similar.
Claim 3.10. One has actually at the “fixed point”:
• ∑b ebm(0) +MCB <∑b µb < (1 + δ)(∑b ebm(0) +MCB);
and for all s ∈ S∗,
• 11+δ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0) <
∑
b d
b
(s) < 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0);
• 11+δ 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0) <
∑
i δ
i
(s) < 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0);
• 11+δ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s) <
∑
bm
b(s) < 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s);
• 11+δ 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s) <
∑
i µ
i(s) < 1k2s
∑
b e
b
m(s).
Let s ∈ S∗. Recall that rd(s) and r(s) belong to the real interval [0, δ].
∑
i δ
i
(s) = 11+δ
1
k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0)
implies rd(0) = 0, thus
∑
b d
b
(s) = 1k1s
∑
b e
b
m(0). But then we have:
1
1+rd(s)
=
P
i δ
i
(s)P
b d
b
(s)
= 11+δ , a
contradiction.
The proof of the other inequalities is similar, as well for the short term inequalities at s ∈ S∗
as for the long term inequalities.
Claim 3.11. At the first period, cash-in-advance and end-of-period budget constraints of consumers
are saturated.
Recalling Remark 3.5, this is obvious for the end-of-period constraints of consumers. For banks,
we first claim that each pib(0) is inferior to its upper bound. Indeed, since each σi and each σb
belong respectively to Bi
(
pi, (σb)b∈B , σ−i , µ
)
and Bb
(
pi, (σi)i∈I , µ
)
. Recalling that µo ≥ 11+δ and
adding the end-of-period constraints (13) and (17), we get∑
i
pii(0) +
∑
b
pib(0) ≤ (1 + δ)a+M(0) +MCB < 2[(1 + δ)a+M(0) +MCB ].
It follows that the end-of-period constraints of banks are saturated. For the cash-in advance
constraints, the proof is based on the previous claim.
Claim 3.12. At the first period,
∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) = 0 and ∑i∈I zi +∑b∈B zb − zG = 0.
Indeed, since cash-in-advance constraints (12) and (16) are saturated, coming back to the proof
of claim 1, we get
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · (∑
i
zi +
∑
b
zb − zG) = 0
thus p(0) ·∑i (xi(0)− ei(0)) = 0 and q ·(∑i∈I zi+∑b∈B zb−zG) = 0. From p(0) 0, we deduce∑
i∈I
(
xi(0)− ei(0)) = 0. From q  0, we deduce ∑i∈I zi +∑b∈B zb − zG = 0.
Remark 3.13. Recalling the behavior of State in the modified truncated economy and Claim 3.9,
we get after summing the end-of-period constraints at time t = 0 of consumers and banks:
p(0) ·
∑
i
(
xi(0)− ei(0))+ q · (∑
i
zi +
∑
b
zb − zG) = µ0[M(0) +MCB − (∑
i∈I
pii(0) +
∑
b∈B
pib(0)
)
],
which implies:
∑
i∈I pi
i(0) +
∑
b∈B pi
b(0) =M(0) +MCB .
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Claim 3.14. For each s ∈ S, cash-in-advance and end-of-period budget constraints of consumers
are saturated.
For consumers, the proof is as in Claim 3.11. For banks, we first verify that each pib(s) is inferior
to its upper bound. Indeed, adding the end-of-period constraints (17) and recalling that µ≥ 11+d
and the previos remark, we get∑
b
pib(s) ≤
∑
b
ebms+
∑
b
pib(0) +R(s) · (A+ zG) + δ(1 + δ) 1
k2s
∑
b
ebm(s)
≤
∑
b
ebms+M(0) +M
CB +R(s) · (A+ zG) + δ(1 + δ) 1
k2s
∑
b
ebm(s)
< M(s) +M(0) +MCB +R(s) · (A+ zG) + δ(1 + δ) 1
k2s
∑
b
ebm(s)
the last inequality coming from Assumption A.4 (2). The rest of the proof is as in Claim 3.11.
Claim 3.15. For each s ∈ S, ∑i∈I(xi(s)− ei(s)) = 0.
Adding the end-of-period 1 constraints at state s of consumers and banks, we get:
p(s)
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)−ei(s)) = µs[M(s)+∑
i∈I
pii(0)+
∑
b∈B
pib(0)+R(s)·(∑
i
zi+
∑
b
zb−zG)−(1+ρ)MCB ]
= µs[M(s) +M(0) +M
CB − (1 + ρ)MCB ].
Recalling that (1 + ρ)MCB ≤ M(s) +M(0) +MCB , we get p(s)∑i∈I(xi(s) − ei(s)) ≥ 0, thus
p(s)
∑
i∈I
(
xi(s)− ei(s)) = 0 and, finally ∑i∈I(xi(s)− ei(s)) = 0.
Claim 3.16. The two following inequalities hold:∑
i
∑
b
υib < 2[
∑
i
eim(0) + (1 + δ)
1
k20
∑
b
ebm(0)],∑
i
zi− +
∑
b
zb− < 2A.
Adding the cash-in-advance constraints (12) of consumers and recalling that µ0 ≥ 11+d , 11+r(0) ≤
1, one gets ∑
i
∑
b
υib ≤
∑
i
eim(0) + (1 + δ)
1
k20
∑
b
ebm(0)
which proves the first inequality. Adding the cash in advance constraints (4) and (9) of consumers
and banks and taking in account Claim Remark 3.13, one gets
R(s) · (
∑
i
zi− +
∑
b
zb−) ≤M(0) +MCB +M(s)
thus
∑
i z
i
− +
∑
b z
b
− ≤ A < 2A.
Claim 3.17. Together with 11+rd ,
1
1+r ,
1
1+ρ ,
p′(s) =
p(s)
µs
∀s ∈ S∗ and q′ = q
µ0
are equilibrium prices for Ec.
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We have already seen that µs ≥ 11+δ for every s ∈ S∗. Dividing by µ0 or µs the appropriate
budget constraints of the modified budget set restore the initial budget set, which proves the claim.
Observe that the equilibrium quantities are xi, zi, zb, δ
b
, µb, pii(0), pib(0), pib(s), υib are unchanged
and that all other equilibrium quantities are divided by the corresponding component of µ.
Claim 3.18. The same prices are equilibrium prices for the original economy.
As it was proved in different parts of the paper, the bounds defining Ec are not binding at
equilibrium. Since the utility functions of consumers and banks are strictly quasi-concave, it
follows that the equilibrium in Ec is an equilibrium of E .
Remark 3.19. It follows from µs ≥ 11+δ ∀s ∈ S∗ that ‖p′(0)‖1 + ‖q′‖1 = 1µ0 ≤ (1 + δ) and
‖p′(s)‖1 ≤ (1 + δ).
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